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EMPOWERMENT THROUGH INCORPORATION?
THE TROUBLE WITH AGREEMENT MAKING
AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
Kouslaa Tunee Kessler-Mata (Chumash/Yokut)*
In this paper, I consider the ability of formal, institutionalized agreements between
tribes and non-federal polities, i.e., states and local governments, to strengthen and
secure tribal sovereignty. I argue that agreement making is a form of incorporation that is
fundamentally at odds with standard definitions of tribal sovereignty, moving tribes
away from their distinctive status as extraconstitutional political entities and into sub-
units of the federal polity. This paper is largely a theoretical enterprise and draws on
theories of federalism and tribal sovereignty, presenting the advantages and challenges of
further incorporation of tribes into the U.S. federal matrix.
I do not conclude that agreement making ought to be abandoned in light of its
discord with tribal sovereignty. Rather, agreement making reflects the needs of tribes in
exercising self-governance and, therefore, ought to be supported by seeking additional
protections from the nation-state, even if this means recasting central tenets of tribal
sovereignty. Specifically, I argue that tribes need additional structural support to ensure
that in the context of agreement-making 1) parties occupy a more equal position at the
bargaining table; 2) enforcement and compliance is agreed upon and ensured; and 3) the
federal judiciary, Congress, and Executive cannot unilaterally upend agreements.
Tribes are more likely to be disadvantaged in the process of agreement
negotiations, from both an institutional and a political perspective; aside from the
reserved rights of states as established in the 10 th Amendment to the Constitution, states
have recourse by applying political pressure to congressional persons and legislators
(local governments can pressure state legislators as well). Moreover, inconsistent
Supreme Court rulings leave available the possibility that Congress can act to extend
* Assistant Professor, Politics Department, University of San Francisco.
1. It is worth noting, too, that the Supreme Court has emphasized on several occasions that there are
important ways in which tribes are not like states. For example, in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,
448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980), the Court put forth that "[t]ribal reservations are not States, and the differences in the
form and nature of their sovereignty make it treacherous to import to one notions of pre-emption that are
properly applied to the other," as quoted in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. Neiw Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192-93
(1989). This does not assist in clarifying the parameters of tribal self-governance deemed legitimate by the
Court, and, indeed, these remain ambiguous. Instead, this shows how the Court insists there are distinctions
between States and tribes that prevent the wholesale application of State recognized rights and preemptions to
tribal governments, without filling in what those distinctions are or ought to be.
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state authority over Indian tribes under the implicit divestiture doctrine.2 This is
important insofar as the Supreme Court may determine that agreement making in general
(or at least particular agreements) is outside the scope of tribal authority in light of its
dependent status.
Without strengthening these elements, agreement making may encourage and
contribute to a debased form of federalism where tribes are continually put in vulnerable
positions and made subject to the demands of non-tribal entities. In its worst form, this
type of incorporation could support the arbitrary interference of federal, state, and local
entities in tribal affairs, whereas the current condition largely supports the arbitrary
interference of federal actors. In short, federalism may offer significant opportunities for
tribal self-governance, but it must be structured in ways that secure, protect, and advance
tribal self-determination more generally. Moreover, if tribes intend to continue building
institutional linkages with non-federal governments, then the concept of tribal
sovereignty ought to be self-consciously amended to reflect this shift toward
incorporation and away from the claim of extraconstitutional status. This is no doubt a
controversial and problematic change to our understanding of tribal sovereignty, and I
will discuss it further at the conclusion of this paper.
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERALISM: A THEORETICAL TENSION
U.S. federalism is often referenced as a poster child of success when discussing
contemporary forms of democratic governance. States gave over particular, articulated
self-governance rights to the central nation-state, with the expectation that all other rights
not prescribed in the Constitution would be retained within their individual spheres of
authority. Those elements of state sovereignty granted to the central nation were essential
for simultaneously fostering a functional central governing authority that could act
without interference from states (e.g., the business of issuing of coinage) and establishing
expectations between states and the central government (e.g., full faith and credit;
reserved rights). The only consideration given tribes within this context was in
establishing relations as exclusive with the federal government in the Commerce Clause
and, less directly, in reference to Indians not taxed, and, lastly, by inference in the Treaty
Clause.
This particular federal framework is symmetrical insofar as the relationships
between the states and the central government do not vary depending on which state is
under consideration. Moreover, states are bound by the parameters set by the
Constitution and its subsequent interpretation in the federal court system. Both
conceptually and constitutionally, it is a significant leap to consider tribes as sub-units of
the U.S. federal system. Tribes are extraconstitutional entities, treated only for the
purpose of recognizing this fact. The relations between tribes and states, on one hand,
and those with the federal government on the other, are each unique in their foundation
2. See Skibine's discussion of implicit divesture as the reasoning that tribal incorporation under the U.S.
federal system is predicated on their dependency status - not sovereign, independent status. Therefore,
activities deemed beyond the scope of those necessary for internal self-governance are no longer within the
purview of the tribe. Alexander Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes Within "Our
Federalism": Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667, 678 (2006).
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and development. Federal Indian law may be generally applicable to all federally
recognized tribes, but the imbalance in the political and economic power between tribes,
states, and the federal government has also resulted in asymmetry of authority, with
greater powers being held by states in relation to their position with the federal
government. Squaring these most basic elements of our constitutional order with my
assertion that tribes are incrementally incorporating themselves as sub-units into the
system by way of agreement making (MOAs, MOUs, etc.), participation in larger
political processes (party politics, political donations, etc.) is difficult to reconcile.
The concept of tribal sovereignty fits very uncomfortably within the federalism
framework. But just what do we mean when we refer to tribes as sovereign entities? This
question must be addressed first in order to understand how federal incorporation can
match, if at all, with the self-governance goals of tribes. Unfortunately, the concept of
tribal sovereignty has suffered greatly from its reliance on and adaptation to a Western
notion of sovereignty, particularly that of nation-state sovereignty. This has resulted in
tribal and legal scholars professing a notion of tribal sovereignty that is, at best, a
romanticized vision of tribes as autonomous, self-governing entities that ought to work
hard to recapture as much of a nation-state kind of sovereignty as possible to secure self-
governance and self-determination. In this section, I will discuss the limits to the
Westphalian notion of sovereignty for tribes and suggest that Felix Cohen's notion of
tribal sovereignty does not offer the best operating principle for tribes to achieve self-
governance and self-determination. 3
Our contemporary understanding of nation-state sovereignty took form through the
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and was shaped through subsequent developments in
international law and governance. The Treaty established and set into operation clear
principles to govern the relationships between warring groups.4 Particularly, the Treaty
recognized states to be the ultimate and final authority within their spheres of governance
(as demarcated through territorial control) and created procedures for engagement
between people based on the goal of mutual amity and related self-interest. 5 Moreover,
the Westphalian notion of sovereignty was embedded with the principle of
noninterference, wherein nations agreed not to interfere in the affairs of other nations.
Later developments and disputes surrounding statehood often focused on the criteria new
groups must meet to function as states within the international community.
More recently, debates in political theory have centered on the principle of
noninterference as a defining aspect of nation-state sovereignty. Particularly, sovereignty
has been assailed for its imperviousness to the grievances and claims of externally and
internally located individuals and groups. By fact of its sovereign status and as a
consequence of the principle of noninterference, nations do not have obligations to
outsiders. They can effectively deny the interrelated nature of relationships that exist
throughout the world, and subsequently, they can shirk the obligations and claims,
violating, ignoring, or being indifferent to all sorts of injustice. Put another way, a claim
3. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1982 ed. 1982).
4. Treaty of Westphalia, Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and their
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by a group for sovereignty is also a claim to be free from moral and legal obligations in
their relationships with externally located individuals and groups.
Does this description of sovereignty adequately describe the status of tribal
governments? The answer is unequivocally "no." Tribes are neither dejure recognized as
sovereign entities since they lack standing as such in the international community, which
is comprised of states, nor are they fully empowered defacto sovereigns as the extent of
their coercive power is significantly limited and trumped by U.S. laws and powers.
Moreover, the extent of tribal internal and external authority has been significantly
upended due to the complex political relationships and the conditions tribes have faced in
the preceding centuries. In the following sections, I will first articulate the general
deficiencies and nuances of the contemporary notion of tribal sovereignty by identifying
paradoxes in federal Indian law, which erode any chance that a Westphalian notion of
sovereignty is attainable for tribes. I also will demonstrate how Felix Cohen's concept of
sovereignty greatly limits the ability of tribes to engage non-federal actors for the
purposes of daily governance and offer alternatives to his vision.6
Legal debates over the degree to which tribes can or should function as
autonomous, self-determining peoples go as far back as the first moments of tribal
contact with European nations,7 though much of the basis for contemporary Indian law
was established during the founding of the United States through the decisions of Chief
Justice John Marshall. The Supreme Court became a central figure in deciding, and later
in making, Indian law largely on the basis of constitutional provisions that mention
Indians a total of three times. Two of the three make reference to tribes' positions
outside of the taxation system, 9 and the third reference to Indians is found in the
Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to "regulate
[c]ommerce with foreign [n]ations, and among the several [s]tates, and with the Indian
[t]ribes." 10
The U.S. Constitution also empowers the President to make treaties with the
consent of the Senate. These general powers of the federal government served as the
basis upon which the Supreme Court entertained questions about the relationship
between Indians and states. The U.S. Chief Justice John Marshall (C.J. from 1810-1835)
constructed the earliest decisions of the Court in Indian law and sought to strengthen
national unity, as well as to establish the authority of the Court as sovereign.12 The first
central Indian law question Marshall entertained was regarding who, states or the federal
6. See COHEN, supra note 3.
7. See id at 50-53.
8. This is not a defense of the Court's right to "make" Indian law or support for the idea that any legal
basis exists for such law making decisions. See DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE, at viii-xi (1997), and Phillip P. Frickey, A Common Law for
Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J.
1, 6-8 (1999), for analyses on the changing role of the Court in Indian jurisprudence.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
10. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. See COHEN, supra note 3, at 207-12, and WILKINS, supra note 10, at 21-
24, for the impact and significance of Indians in the U.S. Constitution.
I1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
12. See generally ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (3d ed. 2000), for an account
of the history of the Supreme Court.
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government, could enter relations with tribes. 13
The questions of law in early Indian cases often involved attempts by state
governments to exercise their authorities and powers over Indian lands and peoples. For
instance, in two of the cases in the Marshall trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia1 4 and
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,15 the state sought to usurp tribal land and divide it amongst
the state's counties for the purpose of extracting gold and other natural resources. By
interpreting treaty provisions made by the federal government with the Cherokee, C.J.
Marshall declared state authority over the tribe void in Worcester.16 Through his trilogy
of cases in the early 1800s, Marshall recognized tribal peoples as having an original
claim to sovereign status and rights of self-government. 17
However, Marshall is also responsible for constructing the first shades of
diminishment of tribal sovereignty by appealing to "the actual state of things,',18 or, in
other words, by accepting particular theoretical constructs of conquest and discovery that
excluded tribes from the same "rights" as European sovereigns. 19 Marshall argued that
the process of treaty making clearly indicated that first, European nations and, second,
the U.S., understood tribes to be sovereigns equal to themselves for the purpose of legal
(land) transactions. Marshall wrote of this relationship in his opinion in Worcester v.
Georgia:
From the commencement of our government, congress has passed acts
to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat them as
nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that
protection which treaties stipulate. All these acts, and especially that of
1802, which is still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian
nations as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries
within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the
lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but
guarantied [sic] by the United States. 20
Marshall constructed an interpretation of treaties that created a relationship of
dominance by the federal government over tribes. He determined that tribes were neither
states nor foreign governments in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,21 despite the treaty-
making relationship that recognized each as holding sovereign powers. Rather, the fact
of their location within the territorial body of the United States placed tribes under
13. Levy also discusses prior congressional attempts at unifying federal authority over Indian affairs. He
states that in addition to constitutional provisions, the Federal Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 forbade the
purchase of Indian land by states without federal approval. Jacob T. Levy, Indians in Madison s Constitutional
Order, in JAMES MADISON AND THE FUTURE OF LIMITED GOVERNMENT 121, 125 (John Samples ed., 2002).
14. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
15. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
16. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
17. See id.; Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1; Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
18. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 543.
19. Through the doctrine of discovery, European nations recognized each other's right to portions of the
Americas that each claimed to have "discovered" independent of one another. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543. Tribes
were recognized as holding a right of occupancy but were denied a property interest in land. Id at 574.
Marshall decided the status of Indian title in Johnson v. McIntosh.
20. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 556-57.
21. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. 1.
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jurisdictional limits of the federal government.22 Moreover, treaties placed tribes under
the protection of the federal government and extinguished the right of tribes to conduct
external affairs. Essentially, tribes had become "domestic dependent nations." 23
Importantly, Marshall's decisions recognized the right of tribes to maintain their
internal self-governance. Lands were set aside for this purpose, and during Marshall's
tenure, it was generally presumed that tribes would maintain a separate existence as
distinct peoples.24 Aside from limits on external relations, the only rights of self-
governance Marshall curtailed were those that were explicitly voided through treaties or
by Congress; tribes retained all other self-governance rights. The Court continued to
adhere to Marshall's Indian law principles for sometime after his reign. Acts of Congress
in the late 1800s, however, initiated a shift in how the Court understood the boundaries
of Indian self-governance and would subsequently make decisions detrimental to tribes.
THE LIMITS OF SELF-GOVERNANCE: PLENARY POWER IN INDIAN COUNTRY 2 5
For Marshall and other interpreters of tribal-federal-state relationships, treaties
served as an important tool for understanding and defining the contours of these
relationships. In their earliest stages, treaty-making between tribes and European powers
recognized a symbiotic relationship between nations and served as a mechanism for their
mutual recognition of self-governance.26 They outlined ways in which tribes and non-
tribal governments should navigate shared interests, including land, resources, and
military protection. As tribal military strength weakened, however, treaties began to
serve the more sinister function of domination over Indians for the benefit of reaping
land and resources for the aggressor, providing tribes with a measure and guarantee of
protection against foreign invaders.27 Treaties with the federal government also
recognized the vulnerability of tribes to the aggressions of state governments and, as a
result, stipulated their commitment to the protection of tribes from the aggressions of the
states. 28
It was the U.S. Supreme Court that would again and again bear the responsibility
for adjudicating claims regarding treaty-rights and other Indian matters and grievances.
Into the late 19th century, the Court continued to distinguish between the spheres of state
22. Id. at 17.
23. Id.
24. In Worcester, Marshall stated,
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own terrtory ... in
which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no
right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokee themselves, or in conformity with
treaties, and with the acts of congress.
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.
25. "Indian Country" is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006) (defining "Indian Country" as: "(a) all land
within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government,
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or
subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the
same.").
26. See COHEN, supra note 3, at 64-65.
27. See id. at 66.
28. See id. at 67-68.
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and tribal political authority but shifted Marshall's emphasis from an inherent, limited
notion of tribal sovereignty, where tribes exercised rights retained prior to contact, to one
wherein tribal dependency on the federal government was the defining characteristic of
the tribal polity and rights exercised by tribes were only those granted by Congress.
Tribal self-governance, then, could be amended however the federal government saw fit
for the purpose and benefit of the tribe. Moreover, such decisions by the federal
government, the Court determined, were not subject to Court review as Congress' right
to engage tribes was itself a political act. Tribes could not legally question the intent of
congressional actions that affected tribal powers of self-governance. Congress'
responsibility and duty to protect tribes was unassailable, containing no substantive
definition and no procedural recourse for tribes.
This transformation from rights retained to rights granted was first articulated by
Justice Miller in 1886 out of what may have seemed as a necessity: state governments
posed a significant threat to tribes. In the case of U.S. v. Kagama, Justice Miller wrote
the following:
They [Indian Tribes] owe no allegiance to the states, and receive from
them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the
states where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From
their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of
dealing of the federal government with them, and the treaties in which
it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the
power.29
The duty of protection cited in Kagama, not fully articulated in Miller's opinion,
took shape in subsequent decisions of the Court. Tribes were considered to be in need of
protection from the federal government not only from state intrusions, but from
themselves as well and for their benefit. Additional Court decisions, including Lone Wolf
v. Hitchcock30 and United States v. Sandoval,31 marked the transition of tribes from
domestic dependent nations, still holding those rights not explicitly abrogated to a
condition of complete legal subjugation to federal authority as embodied in Congress.
The Court expanded the parameters of congressional power over Indians in Lone Wolf
first by supporting Congress' abrogation of treaties under any and all conditions.
Recognizing that treaties are essentially political agreements, the Court rendered itself
irrelevant and incapable of judging whether Congress was violating its duty of protection
to Indians when abrogating treaty rights.
In Sandoval, Justice Van Devanter indicated that Indians were "essentially a
simple, uninformed, and inferior people," 32 thereby necessitating their protection
through the use and application of federal expenditures - a justification provided in lieu
of reserved or treaty stipulated rights. Because "the United States [i]s a superior and
civilized nation" 33 with the obligation to protect Indians, Van Devanter reasoned that the
29. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
30. See Lone Wolf 187 U.S. 533.
31. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
32. Id. at 39.
33. Id. at 46.
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"true interests of the Indian" 34 could only be decided by Congress, not the courts. This
notion of the "guardianship" responsibility of Congress was essentially unlimited in
scope, both in Sandoval and Lone Wolf
Importantly, in tracing the origins and rationale behind Congress' plenary power,
scholars and practitioners of federal Indian law have come to the conclusion that certain
aspects of plenary power are defensible and worth keeping, while other aspects are less
defensible and ought to be abandoned. Particularly, David E. Wilkins finds that the
preemptive and exclusive aspects of plenary power are often used to protect tribes from
the encroachment of states when states seek to "make jurisdictional inroads" in tribal
affairs and territories. 35 He deems these are "constitutionally permissible" functions of
the concept, which suggests that retaining federal plenary power in these ways might be
beneficial for tribes as it serves a "needed" purpose.36 On the other hand, in so far as
plenary power is construed as enabling Congress to exercise its powers in Indian affairs
without the advice and consent of tribes and particularly if it results in an infringement of
tribal authorities and self-governance, then it is not permissible and in violation of the
extraconstitutional standing of tribes.
While I agree with Wilkins that Congress can occasionally exercise its plenary
power to the advantage and protection of tribes, there are no actual limits or barriers to
Congress' doing so for their benefit. In fact, I concede Corntassel and Witmer's point
that Congress is more likely to act on behalf of its non-Indian constituents under the
current framework, as I will discuss shortly. Rather than carving out acceptable domains
for the exercise of Congressional plenary power, it may be possible that tribal agreement
making and engagement with states puts additional obstacles in Congress' way by
linking the fate and relationships of tribes with other governments. In other words, the
stronger the institutional and political relationship between tribes and non-federal
governments, the weaker the plenary authority of Congress to act in Indian affairs will
be. I do not take the plenary authority of Congress to be justifiable under any conditions,
but I do recognize it as a political-turned-legal reality that tribes must attempt to curtail
in order to exercise self-governance.
Tribal sovereignty is, for our purposes here, first and foremost a legal concept.37
The most often cited depiction of tribal sovereignty was put forward by Felix S. Cohen,
now recognized as "the father" of Indian law, and published in his work for the
Solicitor's Office in the Department of the Interior, Handbook of Federal Indian Law.
34. Id.
35. David E. Wilkins, The U.S. Supreme Court's Explication of "Federal Plenary Power:" An Analysis of
Case Law, Affecting Tribal Sovereignty, 1886-1914, 18 AM. INDIAN Q. 349, 362 (1994).
36. Id. at 362.
37. See DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 48
(2002). Increasingly, some scholars argue that tribal sovereignty is also a concept imbued with "unique cultural
and spiritual dimension[s]" which make it substantially different from state or federal connotations of
sovereignty. Id. For example, Wilkins defines tribal sovereignty as "the intangible and dynamic cultural force
inherent in a given indigenous community, empowering that body toward the sustaining and enhancement of
political, economic, and cultural integrity. It undergirds the way tribal governments relate to their own citizens,
to non-Indian residents, to local governments, to the state government, to the federal government, to the
corporate world, and to the global community." Id. (emphasis omitted). I will not take issue here with this
definition other than to suggest that cultural and spiritual dimensions of tribes cannot be fully realized without
proper protections for self-governance and self-determination.
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Specifically, Cohen emphasized the inherent and extra-constitutional nature of tribal
sovereignty:
Those powers which are lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in
general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Congress, but
rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been
extinguished. Each Indian tribe begins its relationship with the Federal
Government as a sovereign power, recognized as such in treaty and
legislation. The powers of sovereignty have been limited from time to
time by special treaties and laws designed to take from the Indian
tribes control of matters which, in the judgment of Congress, then,
must be examined to determine the limitations of tribal sovereignty
rather than to determine its sources or its positive content. What is not
expressly limited remains within the domain of tribal sovereignty.38
Cohen's definition was instrumental when he crafted it as he was seeking to
establish grounds for the resurrection of federal support and acknowledgment of tribal
peoples as separate governing entities. The result was significant for tribes, marking a
move by the federal government from its assimilationist policies of the late 19 th century
and into the constitutional governance models of the early 20t century. Tribes, in large
part due to Cohen's support, were recognized as retaining inherent self-governance
rights, which could be reconstituted through the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.
Cohen's concept of tribal sovereignty did not directly address the role of Congress in
administering Indian affairs, and instead, successfully created a protected legal status for
tribes that at once acknowledged their subjugated position in the U.S. (e.g. "limited"
sovereigns). At the same time, it reinforced the inherent powers of the tribes that existed,
at least until Congress limited them. This pronouncement on tribal sovereignty suggests
that tribes retain all powers not otherwise delegated to the federal government, or
contrary explicit Congressional action, and it is the closest thing on the federal Indian
law books that emulates a "Tenth Amendment" (reserved rights) doctrine for tribes.
THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP AS THE FOUNDATION OF ARBITRARY INTERFERENCE
Wilkins and Lomawaima recognize that tribes face challenges to their status as
sovereign entities, particularly in their relationships with state, local, and federal
governments in his numerous writings on the subject. 39 These "contest[s] over
sovereignty" have characterized much of the legal and political history of tribal
intergovernmental relationships and have resulted in significant reductions in the
governing authority of tribes. 40 Moreover, years of court rulings have established two
important conceptual modifications on tribal exercise of sovereignty: plenary power and
the trust doctrine. That congressional plenary power over Indian affairs is sourced in a
misguided 19 h century understanding of Indians as culturally "immature" wards and
protectorates of the United States has in no way reduced the fact of Congress' power. 4 1
38. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1945).
39. See DAVID E. WILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN INDIAN
SOVEREIGNTY AND FEDERAL LAW (2001).
40. Id. at 5.
41. See Jacob T. Levy, Three Perversities of Indian Law, 12 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 329 (2008) (further
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Surely, tribes would do away with this type of arbitrary interference in their
internal affairs if they could. But given the framework within which tribes must operate,
plenary power is a defining structural constraint that hangs over every aspect of tribal
self-governance. Plenary power does the bulk of the work that makes tribal sovereignty
fluid and unstable. On the other hand, tribes often appeal to the "trust relationship" as
both a legal and moral claim against the federal government. This concept is intended to
acknowledge the exclusive and extraconstitutional status of tribes, the consequent
attenuated powers of tribes' sovereignty post-contact, and to provide a basis for tribal
claims against the United States. Trust-based claims; however, are a complex tie that
binds tribes to the United States in ways that may not be best suited for encouraging
tribal self-governance and self-determination.
The trust doctrine is a general, relatively undefined principle of Indian law, and it
is sourced in moral judgments about the relationship and obligation of the United States
towards Indian tribes. Initially articulated by Justice Marshall in the Cherokee Cases,42
the trust doctrine thus conceived did not carry with it the likeness of more conventional
trustee relationships that presume the eventual transfer of property or money being held
to the recipient. In other words, Marshall's concept of the trust relationship between
tribes and the federal government did not include an end point or even the eventual
termination of the relationship; the trust was presumed to be ongoing. Tribes would
always be the weaker bodies in need of federal protection, and this status would not
change. 43
But changes in the social, economic, and political status of some tribes have forced
questions regarding the federal government's trust obligation to tribes. The ambiguous
and unprescribed character of the doctrine, in addition to its inconsistent and incoherent
usage in court decisions, has fostered questions about the parameters and need for the
trust relationship when tribes demonstrate increased autonomy and self-sufficiency.
Indeed, tribes are often concerned that protections and guarantees received and based on
the trust relationship might disappear if they are perceived by non-tribal governments as
being too self-sufficient and independent. By incorporating Wilkins' concerns, we also
see that such claims may be weakened further by the perception that tribes are no longer
distinct enough from other Americans - culturally or politically.
Indian law scholars have identified two divergent interpretations of the trust
doctrine, each with distinct implications for tribal autonomy and self-governance. The
first of these interpretations does not anticipate eternal tribal pupilage as Marshall's
concept suggests. Rather, the scope of federal obligations to tribes was defined in terms
of the racial inferiority of Indians during the end of the 19 th and throughout the first half
of the 20th century.44 Judicial interpretations of the trust doctrine acknowledged the
inferiority of tribes and broadened the powers of Congress to legislate in Indian affairs
however it saw fit. The consequent congressional policies of assimilation and
discussing the concepts of maturation and their role in U.S. policy making in Indian affairs).
42. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1
(1831).
43. Note, Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law, 98 HARv. L. REV. 422 (1984).
44. Id. at 427.
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acculturation sought to break the political ties and responsibilities between tribes and the
federal government. 45 Importantly, the policies that resulted from the racial inferiority
and immaturity thesis did not result in increased tribal self-governance or authority, but
sought instead its total eradication.
The second interpretation of the trust doctrine used by the courts likewise does not
envision a time when tribes would be capable of managing their own affairs. Instead of
resulting in the termination of the federal trust relationship, this interpretation results in
the perpetual pupilage of tribes. The "control" thesis is not tied to theories of culture or
race, but to the fact of federal supervision and control over tribal land and mineral
resources. In a post-hoc justification for federal control, the Court provides the circular
logic that control over resources creates a duty with regard to such resources, and that
this duty is also what justifies control over them. 46 The control thesis, it appears, is
theorized independent of tribal capacity for management. The Court does not justify the
authority of the federal government to manage Indian resources on the basis that tribes
cannot do it themselves, but rather on the basis that the federal government is already
doing it.
Neither interpretation of the trust doctrine leaves much room for tribal self-
governance and self-determination. Under both interpretations, tribes and tribal affairs
are the objects of federal scrutiny and unfettered intervention, though for different
reasons. Nonetheless, many tribal leaders and federal Indian law scholars have relied on
the concept for calling into question the failings of the federal government in fulfilling
responsibilities to tribes. The concept is used to appeal both legally and normatively that
the trust relationship ought to legally bind the federal government to perform certain
responsibilities (especially those articulated in treaties) and that fulfillment of such duties
is a moral commitment on behalf of the United States. This "high obligation" contends
and competes with other obligations and considerations in the court context, and "little
has been done to explicate the enforceable duties of the trustee." 4 7 The trust doctrine
emphasizes the protection of tribes by the federal government as a moral and legal duty,
that the United States "act with the utmost integrity" and in a "moral manner" in
exercising its duties prescribed by treaty as well as in its future dealings with tribes. 48
And to a certain and exacting extent, federal courts have narrowly identified cases in
which federal agencies have violated their fiduciary duties to act as trustees for Indian
tribes. 49
Most relevantly for our purposes here, the trust responsibilities of the federal
government are thought to be "mandated" by virtue of the extraconstitutional status of
tribes. Because tribes are not a part of the U.S. federal matrix, they stand in a precarious
position to both the federal and state governments. Trust responsibilities are sourced in
treaties and internationally recognized legal documents that establish protections for
45. See General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887). See also H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d
Cong. (1953).
46. Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law, supra note 43, at 428.
47. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 85 (1987).
48. WILKINS, supra note 37, at 45.
49. See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
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Indians and which would otherwise not be available, in part because tribes do not fall
under the U.S. Constitution. 50 If the trust responsibility is both a way of categorizing
tribal-specific treaty rights and a way of protecting the tribal-federal relationship as such,
then it would seem clear enough that treaty abrogation would violate the trust
responsibility. But in fact, the Court's interpretation of Congress' plenary power trumps
any treaty-based claims, at least in so far as they have the best intentions of the Indians at
heart. That the U.S. Supreme Court is the arbiter of such decisions is itself evidence that
tribes do not maintain a comprehensive status as extraconstitutional polities.
Tribes have ample reason to be concerned about how the federal government
exercises its fiduciary duties. Numerous examples exist of the federal mismanagement of
tribal resources, though perhaps none has received as much public attention as the Cobell
case. 51 Since 1887, the federal government took charge of the legal title to millions of
acres of Indian land, which were subsequently to be managed for the benefit of Indian
people.52 Significant mismanagement of monies occurred in the handling of individual
Indian leases; this fact there is no disagreement on. 53 How to resolve the problem forces
the moral and legal obligation of the federal agency in question (the Bureau of Indian
Affairs) to be quantified monetarily. On this point, neither party seems to agree on what
constitutes proper compensation.
Regardless of the outcome, however, the federal government and tribes have
sought to develop ways to prevent such mismanagement from occurring in the future.
One possibility, advanced on the part of the federal government, is to pass the
responsibility for lease management over to tribes. While consistent with Congress'
policy of self-determination, tribes and individual Indians are leery of inheriting the
management of their own assets because such a move by the federal government appears
to be an attempt to "get out" of the "Indian business" and wash its hands clean of its trust
obligation.54 Tribes are set against any attempt by the federal government to minimize or
relinquish responsibilities for managing assets and resources.
With a similar intent, a number of the nation's wealthiest tribes continue to apply
for and receive federal monies for the development of tribal programs. Receiving grants
ensures that the trust relationship remains "active" with the federal government and that
ties between the two are not significantly weakened; at a minimum, a working
relationship remains. There is a fear on the part of tribes that the federal government will
narrow its view as to what it sees as its obligations and responsibilities based on the
services it is providing them at any given time, particularly because such obligations are
poorly spelled out and rarely explicitly acknowledged. An underlying implication is that
if tribes become self-sufficient in providing their own services and are increasingly
economically autonomous, then the unique federal-tribal relationship will cease to exist,
50. WILKINS, supra note 37, at 45.
51. See Cobell v. Salazar, 573 F.3d 808 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
52. See General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
53. This assumes, of course, that trust accrues not just between tribes and the federal government but also
between individual Indians and the federal government by virtue of their membership in a tribe.
54. But to what extent did Marshall's conception of trust extend into the internal affairs of Indians? Would
the groundwork he laid for the federal government's protection and guardianship of tribes imagine a scenario




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 47 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol47/iss3/5
EMPOWERMENT THROUGH INCORPORATION?
as will tribes' position as extraconstitutional political entities. The only other moment in
recent history that bears a similar story wherein the relationship between tribes and the
federal government was peeled back was during the termination era, at which time some
tribes ceased to exist for the purposes of the federal government. That is clearly not a risk
that tribes are willing to take.
But federal obligations and responsibilities to tribes should not be dependent on the
extent of tribal dependency. Moreover, the trust relationship is not the only format that
obligations and responsibilities ought to take, particularly since the relationship brings
with it a position of domination for the federal government over tribes, even more than it
brings with it a protection. It is clearly antithetical to the pursuit of self-governance and
self-determination that tribes continue to seek out opportunities for dependency. Under
this characterization of the trust relationship, its greatest strength and potential for tribes
is that which has been secured through court cases (namely, review of agency actions).
However, a shift in focus to alternative mechanisms and the development of enforceable
agreements is also clearly in order.
IN SUM
What defines the contours of tribal sovereignty today are aspects unique to tribes
by virtue of their historical relationships and political conditions with the U.S. Charles
Wilkinson remarks on the fluidity of sovereignty when he writes,
Somewhat astonishingly, just sixteen days after deciding
Oliphant [holding that Indian tribes lacked inherent criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians] the Court rendered an endorsement of
the tribal sovereignty doctrine in such ringing terms that the existence
of the doctrine, so uncertain just a few days before, now seemed
irrevocably to be established as part of the nation's constitution and
political system (referencing U.S. v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978),
wherein the Supreme Court ruled that prosecutions of Indians in
federal and tribal court do not violate the 5 th Amendment's prohibition
of double jeopardy).55
Wilkinson's reference illustrates just how vulnerable dimensions of tribal
sovereignty are to Supreme Court interpretations of Congress' intent and the status of
tribes as extraconstitutional entities. Plenary power, as the overriding principle
determining the extent of tribal authorities, and the trust doctrine do not protect the rights
of tribal polities to pursue self-governance and self-determination. Rather, they provide
the seeds of instability in Indian affairs that ultimately undermine these rights and ought
to be constrained in any reconstruction of tribal sovereignty. Tribes must secure
mechanisms for ensuring their self-governance rights and foster self-determination for
the future.
The twin goals of self-governance and self-determination may best be achieved
through exercising rights and authorities structured by governance processes and
institutional building, particularly through intergovernmental relationships with non-
55. WILKINSON, supra note 47, at 61.
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federal polities. If tribes increasingly act in their capacity to build intergovernmental
relations with states, then the conceptual and practical pressures put on both the U.S.
federal system and tribal sovereignty will not hold. There is little to suggest that tribes
will or should slow in building these relationships, but the implications for both concept
and practice should be explicitly considered.
AGREEMENTS AS A FORM OF FEDERAL INCORPORATION
There exist a wide variety of institutionalized relationships between tribal and non-
tribal governments for the purposes of pursuing cooperative, regionally based activities.
These agreements usually take the form of memoranda of understanding ("MOU") and
memoranda of agreement ("MOA") between individual tribes and individual states,
which address issue-specific concerns, such as the distribution and use of waterways
shared by communities or taxation concerns. In several instances, congressional
legislation has forced tribes and states to develop agreements, either by clear mandate or
by logical effect. I will discuss the significance of agreement making for expanding tribal
self-governance and draw on examples of contemporary tribal-state relations. I identify
both the potential of agreements for helping structure relations and principles between
tribes and states, as well as the inherent limitations of agreement making for fostering
tribal self-determination under present conditions.
While only some agreements made between tribes and states are the direct result of
congressional legislation, the vast majority of agreements are not, and instead, developed
largely in the absence of federal guidance and oversight. 56  For non-federally
commandeered agreements, there is no approval or even filing requirement for tribes
within the Bureau of Indian Affairs or other federal agencies. In fact, some scholars
suggest these relationships have taken place in direct defiance of federal policy and
Supreme Court decisions such as Kagama and its progeny. 57 In short, changes since
Kagama in state government orientation toward tribes has created political and legal
opportunities for these governments to work together and address overlapping issues and
56. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA") of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467, is one of
the few examples of federally-mandated agreements between tribes and states. Under IGRA, tribes that wish to
pursue class III (high stakes gaming) must enter into compact negotiations with the governor of the state in
which the gaming will occur (some tribal reservations cross multiple state-lines). The compact must then be
approved by the state legislature before implementation and filed with the National Indian Gaming
Commission (an independent federal regulatory commission housed within the Department of the Interior). On
the other hand, legislation extending certain state jurisdiction over tribes within their boundaries (Pub. L. 83-
280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953)) created not a mandate for agreement-making, but the possibility of it. Particular states
found that entering into law enforcement agreements with particular tribes enabled the two polities to navigate
the highly contentious question of who holds civil and criminal jurisdiction within reservation communities.
Public Law 280 remains one of the most detrimental examples of Congressional plenary power in Indian
affairs, and the emergence of agreement-making shouldn't necessarily be interpreted as a positive step,
considering the conditions. However, this is an example of how tribes, states, and localities have interacted
with one another to find common ground and in the absence of a mandate by the federal government. See
Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First Century? Some Data at
Last, 38 CoNN. L. REV. 697, 728-29 (2006).
57. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the "Deadliest Enemies" Model of Tribal-State Relations 16, 24
(Mich. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 05-03, 2007),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1007756. As Fletcher points out, the Kagama
view of tribal-state relationships focused almost exclusively on the desire of states to eliminate tribal people
and assert authority over tribal land and resources.
612 Vol. 47:3
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 47 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol47/iss3/5
EMPOWERMENT THROUGH INCORPORATION?
concerns.58 Moreover, the era of federal devolution of powers has, as articulated in the
first chapter, resulted in the recognition and support of latent tribal power and authorities.
Self-governance for tribes has subsequently brought states and localities into increasing
instances of conflict and interaction.
Self-governance has raised new debates and conflicts over criminal and civil
jurisdiction, taxation, and regulatory authorities within the external boundaries of
reservation communities, as well as questions regarding over whom those authorities
extend (tribal member/non-tribal member). While rarely marked by violent uprisings,
these conflicts can result in a zero-sum approach by states and tribes to address these
issues, each declaring their activities immune to the concerns and objections of other
externally located polities. Tribes and states are creating institutions aimed at mitigating
and mediating potential disputes, attempting to procure mutually beneficial agreements
and sharing responsibilities when they agree to come together on an identified issue.
Importantly, these relationships are starting at the ground - where the need for
cooperation and resolution is clearest - and may take shape in the form of advisory
councils to and within state governments or as independent bodies outside of both tribal
and state governments. 59 National organizations of both states and tribes have identified
the value of these agreements in the exercise of daily governance and have,
subsequently, created model agreements and recommendations for how to proceed in
agreement-making for their relative constituencies. 60 These arrangements are largely
constructed out of necessity to address matters of day-to-day self-governance.
NEGOTIATING GEOGRAPHIES AND JURISDICTIONS: TwO CASES
In the section that follows, I will sketch out two cases from Indian Country where
local-level agreement making is taking place. The first brief profile is perhaps the most
straightforward and, at first glance, commonplace: a development issue arises between a
tribe and the local county.61 The two entities come together to resolve a host of problems
58. Id.
59. To the best of my knowledge, no tribal government currently has an advisory position or panel afforded
to a state for its internal governance debates, whereas states have advisory commissions and panels that include
tribal representatives.
60. The National Congress of American Indians posts agreements on their website with the intention that
they be used by others as needed. These agreements are submitted by tribes and appear under the general
headings of law enforcement, human services, and taxation, and include a range of authorities, from narrowly
constructed agreements to govern the execution of warrants by state officials on tribal lands, to more broadly
construed agreements that provide the parameters for exercising concurrent policing by states and tribes on
tribal land. See Tribal Governance, NAT'L CONGRESS AM. INDIANS, http:/ http://www.ncai.org/Tribal-
Governance.27.0.html (last visited Aug. 2010). The National Conference of State Legislators, on the other
hand, participates in a State-Tribal Initiative, helps resolve and raise conflicts between tribes and states through
dialogue and NCSL's Native American Caucus (of state legislators), and publishes reports on Indian-related
state legislation and books on models of cooperation for tribal-state governance. See State-Tribal, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/Default.aspx?TabJD=756&tabs=951,70,390#390
(last visited Aug. 2010). Noticeably absent, however, are activities involving the National Association of
Counties (NACo).
61. Common is perhaps too gross a term to use in this context. Little systematic research on tribal-state
agreements - let alone tribal-county level agreements - exists at this time. Three useful works that inform
my assessment are THE TRIBES AND THE STATES: GEOGRAPHIES OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL INTERACTION (Brad
A. Bays & Erin Hogan Fouberg eds., 2002), JEFFREY S. ASHLEY & SECODY J. HUBBARD, NEGOTIATED
SOVEREIGNTY: WORKING TO IMPROVE TRIBAL-STATE RELATIONS (2004), and Erich Steinman, American
Federalism and Intergovernmental Innovation in State-Tribal Relations, 34 PUBLIUS: THE J. OF FEDERALISM
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raised in the county-proposed development and they successfully - without much
fanfare - come to a formal agreement about land and jurisdiction. At least superficially,
this can be deemed an example of a positive working relationship between tribal and
county government. The second profile is of the challenges a tribe faces in gaining
acceptance to their regional association of governments in order to influence
transportation policy that affects the reservation community. The tribe has been, to this
date, unsuccessful in breaking the barriers it faces to become a voting member of the
association. This is, clearly, a profile of a breakdown in negotiating governance and the
types of dynamics that can frustrate and stonewall a tribe when dealing with local
governments. Together, these two portraits demonstrate a bit of variety in the processes
and challenges underlying intergovernmental agreement making and begin to shed light,
for my purposes here, on how tribal political activities may be shaping the future of how
we conceptualize tribal sovereignty.
Tulalip, Washington
Reservation communities across the United States are coming into increasing
contact and interaction with non-Native communities. Many reservations already have
complex patterns of land ownership, creating a patchwork or "checkerboarded" map with
an overlapping and confusing maze of jurisdictional responsibilities for tribes, the
federal, state, and local governments. Individual Indians and non-Indians may own land
within the boundaries of a reservation, and both tribal governments and individual
Indians may have land held in trust for them by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 62
Compounding this already challenging governance problem, increasing economic power
by tribes, along with expanding non-Indian communities that lie outside of reservation
boundaries, have created planning and development conflicts.
In Washington state, for example, in the mid-1990s the tribal government for the
Tulalip Indian Reservation developed a comprehensive land use plan that sought, in large
part, to set protective zones for the tribe's watershed and coastal areas. At around the
same time, Snohomish County developed its own plan for development on land within
and surrounding the reservation. This plan was a part of a larger attempt by the state to
monitor growth and accommodate increasing housing demands in the metropolitan
regions of the state. The county's plan and the tribal development plan were in conflict
with one another, with far greater development envisioned by the county. 63
Importantly, there are three Washington state legislators who are also tribal
members and who participate in the Native American Caucus of the National Conference
of State Legislators ("NCSL").64 State representative John McCoy is the chair of the
95 (2004).
62. Lands set aside by the federal government for the occupation of Indians were opened up for
homesteading by whites in 1887 as part of the Dawes Act. Much of the land that was reserved for Indians fell
into non-Indian hands and, by 1934, when homesteading of Indian lands was officially abandoned and many
tribes adopted new government structures through the Indian Reorganization Act, numerous non-Indians
suddenly found themselves within the reconstituted boundaries of tribal reservations. The ownership of land by
non-Indians within boundaries of a reservation community constitutes "checkerboarding."
63. Dave Wortman, Suburban Sprawl Hits Tribal Land, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, March 12, 2001,
www.hcn.org/issues/198/10303.
64. I discuss the potential significance of native state-legislators, infra pp. 615-17.
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NCSL Native American Caucus, a recognized and respected (albeit non-elected) tribal
leader who lives in Tulalip, and represents Snohomish County where Tulalip is located.
Moreover, McCoy takes advantage of Washington State's distinctively unrestrictive
policies on conflicts of interest; McCoy is able to represent both the tribe and the state
without running afoul of ethics regulations.65 Suffice it to say, the tribe enjoys the
distinct advantage of having a seasoned politician as a tribal member, lobbyist, and
elected State representative.
Aside from resolving the obvious questions of jurisdictional authority in
implementing and administering either of the plans, the county and tribe had to first
establish a functional and working relationship to resolve the plans' most contentious
and troubling conflicts. Over a three year period, tribal leaders and county officials met
to address the land use issues and arrive at agreements that would best protect and ensure
progress for both parties. On the tribes' account, they successfully managed to stave off
future, unexpected encroachments by non-Indians, protect their land base, and construct
a working relationship with the county. While the endurance and fortitude of this
relationship will be measured by time, it is evident that the process of federalization is
underway in this context. What is unique and which makes this situation difficult to
replicate in other contexts is the presence of a senior state elected official who also
serves as an important leader in tribal politics. This factor likely facilitated the tribe and
county coming together to negotiate their intergovernmental agreement by providing
incentives for county cooperation.
Humboldt and Hoopa, California
The Hoopa Tribe in northern California has, for the better part of two decades,
made a substantial effort to attain membership in the Humboldt County Association of
Governments ("HCAOG"). The Tribe's primary goal is to participate and vote in
discussions related to transportation, funding, and distribution that HCAOG receives
from the state and federal governments. At present, tribal governments are not allowed to
become members of HCAOG, while incorporated cities and the Humboldt County
government have representatives in the organization and are voting members. A recent
vote on the question of Hoopa's membership (January 2007) reflected a 4-4 split
amongst the members with no rule in place to break tie votes. 6 6
At stake are millions of dollars in transportation funding that are split between the
seven member cities and the county each year. The Hoopa tribal community is not an
incorporated city but holds the status of a public agency. The California State Legislature
conferred this status in 1987 in an effort to explicitly make the tribe eligible for
membership under HCAOG's bylaws. However, at nearly every session of HCAOG
65. See, e.g., Angela Galloway, Laivmakers Use Public Office to Help Private Interest: State 's Rules on
Conflicts of Interest Fuzzy at Best, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, January 8, 2004,
www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Lawmakers-use-public-office-to-help-private-l134155.php. According to the
paper, McCoy lobbies the state legislature on behalf of the tribe (particularly in the area of economic
development enterprises and taxation on the reservation), and sits on the House Commerce Committee for the
State. Other legislators represent municipalities and special districts from other parts of Washington, as well.
66. Elaine Weinreb, Hoopa Denied Membership in HCAOG, HUMBOLDT ADVOC. ONLINE, Jan. 11, 2006
(copy on file with author).
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since 2005, the Board of Directors has been presented with the question of the tribe's
membership that, thus far, has resulted in tie-votes and technicalities, thereby preventing
a final decision on the matter.
The case for Hoopa's inclusion as a member on HCAOCG goes something like this:
HCAOG is the regional planning organization in Humboldt County. Mayors from each
of the incorporated cities sit on the Board of Directors, along with the President of the
Board of Supervisors for the County, and together they make final determinations on
how state and federal funding are to be spent in the region. Hoopa is a checkerboard
reservation of close to 88,000 acres in the northeast corner of Humboldt County, with
over twenty six hundred Indian and non-Indian residents, is surrounded by non-tribal
communities and cities, and is only accessible via Highways 299 and 96.67 Economic
development on the reservation is limited, and most employment comes in the form of
seasonal work (tourism industry, logging, and fishing). The majority of non-seasonal
employment is found outside of the reservation, 120 miles away in the city of Arcata,
California. Roads and safety matters take particular concern for the tribe, if only, because
of the vast amount of driving residents must do to get to and from jobs.
The Tribe seeks participation in HCAOG in order to have a voice in how funding
is distributed for projects across the county. Their resident population is more than
double that of some HCAOG member cities (Blue Lake has close to eleven hundred, and
Trinidad has a mere three hundred and eleven people, for instance), and they have more
roads and highways to care for in their reservation boundaries than some members.
When the Tribe first sought inclusion to HCAOG, they went to their state legislator who
advocated on their behalf in the legislature to receive status as a public agency, which
they received. HCAOG rebuffed the tribe even with their newly established status.
While Hoopa has successfully garnered some support for their inclusion in
HCAOG, recent debates in HCAOG meetings on the matter reflect concerns about 1) the
inclusion of tribes other than Hoopa (opening the flood gates) and 2) tribal sovereignty.
HCAOG members are worried that the seven other tribes in the Humboldt region will
also seek membership, thereby potentially making drastic changes to the current status
quo and reshaping the organization (not to mention the potential impact on funding
distributions!). In fact, since 1987 several additional tribes have expressed their intent to
join HCAOG, should they be able to. None have, at this point, become members, and
since 2005 the association has revised its membership criteria to limit which
incorporated cities and public agencies can become members based on population, land
base, and other factors, such as requiring a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for
tribes. 68
Several vocal opponents to Hoopa's inclusion cite the tribe's status as a federally
recognized tribe as a reason for rejecting their inclusion in the organization. Tribes are
67. HOOPA VALLEY INDIAN RESERVATION TRANSPORTATION PLAN, 1996-2001 (December 5, 1996),
available at http://ceres.ca.gov/planning/hoopa/transportation.html.
68. Shelly Baldy, Hoopa Continues to get scraps from HCAOG Table, 13 NATINIXWE, No. 5, Jan. 31, 2007
(copy on file with author). According to the Joint Powers Agreement ("JPA") governing HCAOG, only public
agencies (and a representative from the Humboldt County Board of Supervisors) can sit on the Board. Hoopa
became a public agency in 1987, via state legislation, and has helped develop the current operating criteria for
the JPA, which includes a limited waiver of tribal sovereign immunity.
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subject to different organizing principles and are distinct political entities, separate from
local cities and counties. These "differences" have resulted in the concern that tribes will
be able to buy the support and votes of other HCAOG members. Donations from some
tribes to candidates in local non-tribal elections have only further inflamed this concern.
At issue is the extent to which tribes can be, and are subject to, other state and federal
laws that guide what local municipalities can and cannot do.
Moreover, tribes are themselves reticent about becoming subject to such laws. The
Chairman of Hoopa argues for the inclusion of the tribe in HCAOG on the basis that the
tribe ought to be considered as an equal to other govermnents for the purposes of the
organization. Additionally, the Chairman argues that tribes are fundamentally distinct
from other govermnents and are therefore subject to an entirely separate body of law.
The tribe is unwilling to voluntarily relinquish its rights to donate, for instance, money to
political candidates, as this is viewed as an infringement on the tribe's sovereignty.69
In an attempt to appease the tribes in the region, HCAOG brought the tribes on
board as members of the technical advisory committee for the organization. On this
committee, they are able to participate in discussions and make recommendations to the
organization, though they have no vote on the Board of Directors. Most problematically,
the tribes' positions on the advisory committee relegate the tribes narrowly by making
them information providers, but lack voting power in the governing decisions HCAOG
makes.
In this case, it seems that the Tribe has gone to great lengths to ensure they have a
seat at the table: they sought and received recognition as a public agency, they agreed to
provide a limited waiver of sovereign immunity, and agreed to be bound by state-made
law (namely, the Brown Act, an open meeting law). 70 Their substantive interests clearly
overlap with the dealings of HCAOG and the long-term vision for their community rests,
in part, on their ability to participate in important regional decision-making processes
such as these. Through any interpretation of federal Indian law, however, there is little
Hoopa can do to ensure it is included in regional non-tribal activities, save federal
mandate (and, likely, local and state ruffled feathers).
LIMITS AND BENEFITS OF AGREEMENT-MAKING
In general, tribal-state or tribal-county agreements are structurally unsupported:
they exist on an ad-hoc basis when both parties agree to come to the table regarding an
issue that, more than likely, has the potential for negatively impacting both stakeholders.
At best, the MOAs and MOUs establish the proper protocol and principles to follow on
the specific issue they are detailed. The most permanent connections between tribes and
states established through MOAs and MOUs are points of contact and the formation of
"sister" agencies or equivalents in each government. These points of contact can provide
for information sharing between tribes, individual Indians, interested non-Indians, and
69. Leo Sears, Looking for a Level Playing Field, TIMES-STANDARD, Feb. 16, 2007, www.times-
standard.com/ci_5242018. Note: The "level playing field" is actually a quote from the HCAOG representative
most opposed to tribal inclusion in the organization. His belief is that non-tribal governments are put at a
disadvantage because tribes can continue to make financial contributions and be exempt from other laws
governing the local governments in HCAOG.
70. The Ralph M. Brown Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54950 (West 2010).
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state government agencies. A person may need to know information regarding the law
governing tribal-state relations in their area or a tribe may need to figure out which state
office should be contacted to address a particular issue. These points of contact can serve
as conduits and breeding grounds for potential agreement-making by being well-
positioned to identify sources of conflict and misunderstanding between tribes and states.
Some states have offices whose purpose is to serve as a liaison with tribes, while
other states have standing committees on Indian affairs within their legislatures. The
majority of institutional support for state-tribal relations at the state level occurs within
the office of the governor, where diplomatic - but not legislative - authority resides.
Native people running for non-tribal office are attempting to fill this void by seeking
election in state legislatures and county boards, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
The benefit for tribes, in the best case scenario, is like that of the Tulalip: a native
legislator serving "double duty" can help bring the parties to the table for negotiations.
That is not; however, what their elected role is, and few states are likely to be as liberal
as Washington on this point. Depending on their seniority, they may not have much
influence at all. Suffice it to say, there is no way - as we see in the case of Hoopa - to
force regional governing authorities to include tribes as relevant parties absent federal
action (which itself will be contingent on political factors that may prevent their
involvement).
Ultimately, the absence of strong federal policy to support intergovernmental
relations between states and tribes, or tribes and local-governments, may threaten their
sustainability and continued development. Several acts of Congress, including the Indian
Gaming and Regulatory Act, the Indian Child Welfare Act, and the Adam Walsh Act,
explicitly mandate tribes and states to work together and, to varying degrees, identify the
parameters those relationships must work within, and who in the federal government
both parties must report to (i.e. Indian Gaming and Regulatory Commission, the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, Department of Justice, and so on). The overriding assumption is that
absent this mandate, tribes and states would not work together regardless of their
mutually shared interest in the issue at hand.
The federal policy of self-determination ought to incorporate tribal polities as
relevant public agencies and authorities for participation in local and regional
governance. On the one hand, forcing tribes and non-tribal governments to the table may
result in additional discord. However, the relationships that can be built through mutual
negotiation and recognition will help protect tribes in the long run as they may find the
hands of the federal government become tied. They will be less likely to pass legislation
with a zero-sum outcome (tribal vs. state) because the futures of tribal, state, and local
interests will have become entangled and contingent on one another in institutional
structures and daily governance. As it stands, ad-hoc agreement-making can help build
these relationships, but it does not guarantee longevity and can actually strain them
depending on the circumstances and conditions.71
71. Goldberg & Champagne, supra note 56, at 728-29 ("Even where cooperative agreements prove, on
balance, beneficial to tribes, it may be difficult to sustain them if state funding falters, liability issues strain
relations, or mutual fear or mistrust make them politically controversial."). The authors are speaking about law
enforcement agreements devised in response to federal legislation.
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EMPOWERMENT THROUGH INCORPORATION?
Formal agreements are one way in which tribes and non-federal governments are
recognizing their overlapping interests and concerns, but they can also serve as mere
arrangements of necessity. Tribes are more likely to be disadvantaged in the
negotiations, from both an institutional and a political perspective. Aside from the
absence of reserved rights held by the states, states have recourse by applying political
pressure to congressional persons and legislators (local governments can pressure state
legislators, as well). 72 Moreover, inconsistent Supreme Court rulings leave available the
possibility that Congress can act to extend state authority over Indian tribes under the
implicit divestiture doctrine. 73 This is important because the Supreme Court may
determine agreement-making (or at least particular agreements) in general is outside the
scope of tribal authority in light of its dependent status.
In the interim, before any such decision of the Court is brought to bear on tribal
and non-tribal agreements (if it ever comes to pass), tribes ought to continue
participating in these agreements and not just because they may advantage the specific
needs of a tribe, but also because the linkages they make in terms of positioning tribes as
federal sub-units can be solidified only over time. Moreover, agreements serve
democratic and legitimating functions in so far as they build public and political
accountability between polities and in the eyes of constituencies. Particularly in the case
of regional boards and commissions, tribal participation can provide an avenue for
engaging in dialogue and provoking public justifications that can mitigate racist
motivations of non-Indians. Public justification to a non-Indian audience is clearly not
one of the objectives tribes have in engaging non-tribal governments. However, states
and localities are, and will be, responsive to their constituencies. Tribes cannot ignore
this and, therefore, will occasionally be forced into the non-Indian public sphere when
navigating these relationships.
For this reason, agreements - and tribes as constituent members of those
agreements - need additional structural support to ensure that: 1) parties occupy an
equal position at the bargaining table, 2) enforcement and compliance with agreements is
assured, and 3) the federal judiciary, Congress, or Executive Branch cannot unilaterally
upend agreements. The absence of an equal position at the table means the conditions of
dominance exacted by states and the federal government will continue and, in the worst
cases, may even be formally adopted as the foundation for relationships between tribes
and states, with the possibility of bringing the bargaining position of all tribes down to
that of the lowest positioned tribe. 74 While there are no quick fixes for leveling the field
between tribes and states, there are legal protections that can be put in place to ensure
tribes receive greater protection and recognition as government entities. This requires
strengthening, not abandoning, the position of tribes as political subunits of the U.S.
72. See cases cited and discussion supra note 1.
73. See Skibine, supra note 2, at 678. Examples of things the court has deemed beyond the scope necessary
of self-governance include 1) the regulation of hunting and fishing by non-members within the boundaries of
the reservation on land held in fee (Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)) and 2) the extension of
tribal government taxes over businesses operated on non-Indian fee land within the reservation boundaries
(Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001). Skibine, supra note 2, at 680-81.
74. See, for example, the ripple effect of negotiating gaming compacts in California where the state
effectively negotiates with the weakest positioned tribe to extract the highest percentage from the tribe's
gaming revenues, and then attempts to bring all other tribes into agreements under the same terms.
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federal system.
On the second point, even when tribes and states or counties develop an
agreement, the absence of enforcement or the presence of non-compliance may threaten
the agreement and undermine already tenuous relationships between polities. This is
exacerbated for tribes when considered in light of the first point that tribes often occupy
the more disadvantageous position in the relationship. Third, in so far as agreements
remain unrecognized in the eyes of federal actors, they may suffer from federal inaction
or action. Without federal protection, non-compliance on the part of states or local
governments can threaten agreements. On the other hand, federal entities can adjudicate,
make law and policy, or interpret agreements as being inconsistent with the federal
vision of what tribal governments are and the associated scope of authorities. Because
this vision differs across time and actors, it would be a difficult feat for those engaged in
agreement-making to construct agreements consistent with federal demands. In short,
while agreements may be one step in the direction of formal subunit status and hold great
potential for improving relationships amongst non-federal political bodies, they remain
in need of larger institutional and structural security for their longevity and health.
Moreover, they must be recognized as tools for the improvement of daily self-
governance and should not be confused with the internal processes of self-determination
of tribes, which are not subject to negotiations with external actors even if those actors
are implicated in them.
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